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We present the first device-independent quantum cryptography protocol for continuous variables. Our
scheme is based on the Gottesman-Kitaev-Preskill encoding scheme whereby a qubit is embedded in the
infinite-dimensional space of a quantum harmonic oscillator. The novel application of discrete-variable device-
independent quantum key distribution to this encoding enables a continuous-variable analogue. Since the se-
curity of this protocol is based on discrete-variables we inherit by default security against collective attacks
and, under certain memoryless assumptions, coherent attacks. We find that our protocol is valid over the same
distances as its discrete-variable counterpart, except that we are able to take advantage of high efficiency com-
mercially available detectors where, for the most part, only homodyne detection is required. This offers the
potential of removing the difficulty in closing the loopholes associated with Bell inequalities.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.-p, 89.70.Cf
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is a method by
which two parties, Alice and Bob, may generate a shared
secret key over an insecure quantum channel monitored by
an eavesdropper, Eve. Any QKD protocol relies on several
assumptions, namely, any eavesdropper must obey the laws
of quantum mechanics; Alice and Bob have the freedom to
choose at least one of two measurement settings; and there is
no classical information leaking from Alice or Bob’s labora-
tories. Most conventional QKD protocols further assume that
Alice and Bob have near perfect control of their measurement
devices as well as their state preparation. Device-independant
QKD [3–5] is a protocol that, remarkably, is free from making
these additional assumptions; Alice and Bob need no knowl-
edge of the inner workings of their devices nor even the di-
mension of the space their quantum states reside in.
In this paper, we use the novel approach of combining
the encoding scheme of [6] with the results of [3, 4] to cre-
ate a device-independent quantum cryptography protocol for
continuous variables (CVs). CV quantum information offers
higher efficiency detectors, cheap off-the-shelf components
and the experimentally accessible Gaussian resources. Fur-
thermore, by encoding the CV space of a harmonic oscillator
into a finite-dimensional code space we are able to take ad-
vantage of results which have previously only been applied to
discrete-variable (DV) QKD.
The first proposals for continuous-variable QKD [7] relied
on ‘non-classical’ states of light such as squeezed states [8, 9].
In fact, one of these protocols was proven unconditionally se-
cure [9]. As the field matured it was recognized that such
non-classical states were not required and that the more ex-
perimentally available class of coherent states were sufficient
[7, 10].
Device-independent QKD provides a way by which two
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parties may share a private key despite having no knowledge
of the inner workings of their respective devices. Conversely,
in conventional QKD protocols it is regularly assumed that
both parties have a high degree of control over both state
preparation as well as measurement. Although, recently re-
laxing the condition of trusting the measurement device was
achieved [11, 12]. The security in this device-independent ap-
proach comes instead from the fact that the two parties are
able to violate a Bell inequality [13], which can remarkably
be used to put a bound on the amount of information that a
potential eavesdropper could, in principle, obtain.
Here we introduce a CV version of device-independent
QKD. Our protocol goes as follows. Alice first generates a
Bell state which has been created using an encoding based
on the Gottesman-Kitaev-Preskill scheme where a qubit is en-
coded into an infinite dimensional space of a harmonic os-
cillator. After this the protocol continues in a similar fash-
ion where she keeps one encoded qubit and sends the other
qubit to Bob over an insecure quantum channel. Hence, the
results of DV device-independent QKD can then be applied
to the system yielding the first implementation of device-
independent QKD for CVs.
It is known in the field of CV quantum information that
all Gaussian resources are insufficient for violating a Bell in-
equality [14, 15]. This means that one should already expect
non-Gaussian states or measurements as being a requirement
[16–20], despite the fact that they are typically more difficult
to produce in a lab. This highlights the challenges faced when
attempting to create a CV version of device-independent QKD
because most current CV-QKD protocols use Gaussian states.
Fortunately, if we use for example, a single mode of the elec-
tromagnetic field as our harmonic oscillator, we are able to
use CV resources, including high efficiency detectors and off-
the-shelf components. The major drawback of DV device-
independent QKD is that in order to close the detector loop-
hole one needs high efficiency detectors [21]. The detector
loophole issue is often overcome by CV quantum information
where we can take advantage of such high detection efficien-
cies [16–20, 22].
This paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II we discuss
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2separately the necessary encoding scheme as well as the re-
sults of DV device-independent QKD. In Sec. III we relate
these concepts to CV quantum information and discuss for-
mally the kind of measurements that are necessary. Follow-
ing this we investigate the resources required in order to im-
plement the protocol in Sec. IV. Since we are only capable
of making approximations of the desired encoding in the real
world, we consider the effects of such approximations on the
encoding and resulting key rate in Sec. V. Finally, Sec. VI
presents some discussions and concluding comments as well
as some interesting open questions.
II. BACKGROUND
The premise of this paper is to propose a method of im-
plementing device-independent QKD with CV states. This
is accomplished by embedding a two-level Hilbert space into
the full infinite-dimensional space and then using results from
DV-QKD. Here we discuss the encoding scheme proposed by
Gottesman, Kitaev, and Preskill (GKP) in [6] as well as the
DV version of device-independent QKD.
A. GKP encoding
The GKP encoding [6] provides a method to encode a qubit
in the infinite-dimensional space of an oscillator in such a
way that one can protect against arbitrary, but small, shifts in
the canonical variables q and p as well as carrying out fault-
tolerant universal quantum computation on the encoded space
[6, 23]. The stabilizer generators of a two-dimensional Hilbert
space in an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space with canonical
variables q, p are given by [9]
Sq = exp(2iq
√
pi), Sp = exp(−2ip
√
pi). (1)
The stabilizers are simply shift operators for q, p, and if the
eigenvalues are Sq = Sp = 1 then the allowed values of q and
p are integer multiples of
√
pi. Since the codewords are invari-
ant under shifts by integer multiples of 2
√
pi we can define a
basis for the encoded qubit as
|j¯L〉 ∝
∑
s∈Z
|(2s+ j)√pi〉q, (2)
for j = 0, 1, and where the subscript q indicates the q
(‘position’)-basis. These states can be approximated opti-
cally using Schro¨dinger cat states [24], or by a variety of
other methods [25–28]. Encoded Pauli gates are defined as
Z¯ ≡ exp(iq√pi) and X¯ ≡ exp(−ip√pi); since these opera-
tors commute with the stabilizers they also preserve the code
subspace.
The set of Clifford operations on the encoded subspace cor-
respond to symplectic (or Gaussian) transformations on the
CV space of the oscillator; these operations can be imple-
mented in a fault tolerant way [6]. To achieve universal quan-
tum computation we must be able to implement a non-Clifford
gate on the encoded subspace [29], for example, the addition
of a pi/8-gate (T-gate) to the Clifford group will make for a
universal set of gates. The T-gate can be implemented with a
non-symplectic transformation on the oscillator; this is more
experimentally difficult than symplectic transformations and
requires a non-Gaussian resource such as photon counting.
The physical resources required to implement these gates are
discussed in more detail in Sec. IV.
B. Device-independent quantum key distribution
The DV-QKD protocol [3, 4] begins with Alice and Bob
sharing a quantum channel that emits pairs of entangled par-
ticles. To consider the worse case scenario, we allow Eve full
control over the source [30] which, if she is honest, emits the
state |ψAB〉 = 1/
√
2(|00〉 + |11〉). But in general she is free
to create any arbitrary state ρABE which may be entangled
between not only Alice and Bob but herself as well. To gen-
erate a secret key, Alice chooses a basis to measure in from
{A0, A1, A2} while Bob chooses a basis from {B1, B2} and
they get outcomes of ai, bj ∈ {+1,−1}, respectively [31].
After all measurements are performed, if Alice had chosen
measurement A0 and Bob chosen measurement B1 they ex-
tract a single bit of raw key corresponding to their measure-
ment outcome. Instead, if they had measurement settings cor-
responding to {A0, B2}, their outcomes are completely un-
correlated and so this case is discarded. For all other mea-
surement settings Alice and Bob use their results to violate
the CHSH inequality [13]
S = 〈a1b1〉+ 〈a1b2〉+ 〈a2b1〉 − 〈a2b2〉 ≤ 2. (3)
The CHSH inequality puts a bound on the values of S con-
sistent with local hidden-variable theories in accordance with
Bell’s theorem [32, 33]. Violation of this inequality by quan-
tum mechanics arises due to the fact that entanglement can
provide nonlocal correlations that cannot be produced by
shared randomness. If Alice and Bob share a nonlocal cor-
relation then, regardless of how this correlation came to exist,
Eve cannot have full knowledge of the correlation or else she
would be in possession of a local variable capable of repro-
ducing the correlations [4].
A set of measurements which give the desired behaviour in
the above protocol and which maximize the violation of the
CHSH inequality are given by [31]
A0 = B1 = Z, A1 = 1/
√
2(Z +X),
B2 = X, A2 = 1/
√
2(Z −X).
(4)
For the moment, Z and X in the above expression (4) have
no relation to the encoded Pauli gates Z¯ and X¯; although we
will make this connection in Sec. III. The main result shown
by Acı´n et al. [4] is that the Holevo quantity between Eve and
Bob, after Alice and Bob have symmetrized their marginals,
is bounded as
χ(B1:E) ≤ h
(
1 +
√
(S/2)2 − 1
2
)
, (5)
3where χ(B1:E) = S(ρE)− 12
∑
b1=±1 S(ρE|b1) is the Holevo
quantity and h = −p log2 p− (1−p) log2(1−p) is the binary
entropy. This provides a method which Alice and Bob can use
to keep Eve honest and bound her knowledge using only their
violation of the CHSH inequality.
III. CONTINUOUS-VARIABLE DEVICE INDEPENDENCE
PROTOCOL
The CV version of device-independent QKD begins with
Alice creating an encoded Bell state. This encoding is based
on the GKP encoding as given in Sec. II A. Once this Bell state
is created she keeps one qubit for herself and sends the other
entangled qubit to Bob over an insecure and lossy quantum
channel. Apart form this initial encoding, the protocol follows
the same steps as in typical DV-QKD protocols [3, 4].
A set of measurements which maximize the violation of the
CHSH inequality, for the encoded state |Φ+〉 = 1/√2(|0¯0¯〉+
|1¯1¯〉), consist of measurements A1, A2, B1, B2, as defined in
Sec. II B, which act on the encoded subspace. We can de-
structively measure the observables Z¯ and X¯ by performing
a suitable homodyne measurement of the qˆ or pˆ quadrature,
respectively. By measuring the qˆ quadrature we expect that
the only outcomes possible will be integer multiples of
√
pi;
even multiples corresponding to a |0¯〉 state and odd multiples
corresponding to |1¯〉. Imperfections in the measurement and
the encoded state will result in other measured values, but we
can apply classical error correction and adjust the value to
the nearest k
√
pi for an integer k. The outcome of the mea-
surement Z¯ is then given by (−1)k. We can measure the
other three observables by first applying a change of basis gate
which takes us to the Z¯ basis, and in this way we need only
consider homodyne measurements of the qˆ quadrature.
We assume in this section that we are able to implement
Clifford gates as well as pi/8-gates on our encoded space and
also that we can carry out homodyne measurements on the
CV space; the resources required to do this are discussed in
Sec. IV. From here onwards we drop the over-bar notation to
denote encoded operations; all gates are to be understood as
acting on the encoded space while symplectic transformations
are understood to be in relation to the oscillator.
It is readily seen that we can measure in the X basis by us-
ing the change of basis gate H , and one can easily verify that
H†XH = Z. Since the Hadamard gate H is in the Clifford
group we can implement an encoded H by carrying out sym-
plectic transformations on the full CV space. Unfortunately,
it is not possible to change from the A1 or A2 basis to the
Z basis by using only Clifford gates, which means that we
will need to go beyond symplectic transformations in the CV
space. This can be readily seen by recognizing that A1 = H ,
suppose there existed a Clifford gateC such thatC†HC = Z.
This would imply that CZC† = H and so C is not a Clifford
gate by definition.
The required change of basis gates can be calculated as:
IB1I = Z, H†B2H = Z, α†A1α = Z, and β†A2β = Z,
where α = PHTHP , β = ZPHTHP and T is an encoded
pi/8-gate. It is important to note that while the latter two gates
are not Clifford gates, they can be decomposed exactly as a
composition of Clifford gates with only one non-Clifford T -
gate. Furthermore, it is possible to shift the problem of im-
plementing a T -gate to a state preparation problem, and since
preparation can be done ‘offline’ we require only Gaussian
operations and one auxiliary state to carry out our CV device-
independent QKD.
IV. REQUIRED RESOURCES
In order for Alice and Bob to implement the necessary
measurements they must be able to perform gates on the en-
coded states as well as homodyne detection on one quadra-
ture. The necessary set of gates include H,P, T (no need
for Z, since Z = P 2). The first two gates correspond to
Clifford operations while the last one is a non-Clifford gate.
The set of Clifford gates on the encoded states correspond to
symplectic transformations on the CV space, given as [6]:
H : (q, p) → (p,−q), P : (q, p) → (q, p − q), and
CNOT : (q1, p1, q2, p2) → (q1, p1 − p2, q1 + q2, p2). The
encoded CNOT gate is used not by Alice or Bob but in the
preparation of the encoded Bell state by Eve.
In order to implement an encoded pi/8-gate we need a non-
symplectic transformation which requires a non-Gaussian re-
source. The addition of photon counting to Gaussian re-
sources is sufficient to carry out non-symplectic transforma-
tions. In particular, one is able to create either a pi/8 state
or a cubic phase state which can then be used to implement a
T -gate on the encoded space [6, 34]. Fortunately, one can gen-
erate these states offline and use them as required throughout
the protocol, effectively shifting the issues of non-Gaussian
operations to state preparation. In this way, one needs only to
have a supply of non-Gaussian states and be capable of per-
forming symplectic transformations (including homodyne de-
tection) in order to implement the QKD protocol. In the case
of an optical mode, the set of symplectic transformations can
be achieved with linear optics (phase shifters and beam split-
ters) and squeezing operations (non-linear crystals).
Fortunately, Alice and Bob do not need to choose a mea-
surement basis, which is used to check for a CHSH violation,
very often; the probability to choose between the possible op-
tions need not be uniform, although this would work as well.
If we suppose that Alice and Bob share N quantum states,
it is enough to use ∼ √N pairs to check for a CHSH vio-
lation, so long as the measurements are causally independent
[35]. This condition would be satisfied for memoryless de-
vices, or devices which could have internal memory reliably
cleared after every run. One protocol [35], also provides secu-
rity against coherent attacks, which is the most general form
attack. Since we have chosen the measurement basis corre-
sponding to generating a key as Z, this means that in the limit
of large N almost all of the time we need only perform Gaus-
sian operations. Hence, we need only perform non-Clifford
operations a small fraction of the time, in order to estimate
the CHSH violation and thus keep the eavesdropper honest.
Many other such DV device-independent QKD protocols ex-
ist and offer different key rates with different underlying as-
4sumptions [36–38], but typically one still requires the ability
to make measurements in a set of four bases which violates
the CHSH inequality.
V. GAUSSIAN FINITE-SQUEEZING EFFECTS
In practice, the encoded GKP states will not consist of delta
peaks at
√
pi intervals, but instead the peaks will have some fi-
nite width and they will be modulated by a larger envelope to
ensure the state is of finite energy. One way to produce an
ideal GKP state is to prepare a momentum eigenstate |p = 0〉,
and then measure the value of q (mod 2
√
pi). Since the posi-
tion is completely undetermined for a momentum eigenstate
all values of q are equally likely, and this measurement will
project out a state that differs from a Z eigenstate by a shift of
q which can then be corrected.
If instead of an unphysical momentum eigenstate,
which corresponds to infinite squeezing, we can con-
sider a finitely-squeezed state given by ψsq(p) =
pi−1/4κ−1/2 exp
(− 12p2/κ2) [39], where κ = e−r for
squeezing parameter r ∈ [0,∞). In the position representa-
tion this state is given by ψsq(q) = pi−1/4κ1/2 exp(− 12q2κ2).
An ideal homodyne measurement of q is a projection-valued
measure (PVM) with projectors corresponding to position
eigenstates Px = |x〉〈x|, or infinitely squeezed states in po-
sition. If we allow the homodyne measurement to have a
Gaussian acceptance of width ∆, we replace the PVM with a
positive-operator valued measure (POVM) which consists of
an ideal homodyne measurement convolved with a Gaussian
window. This leads to POVM elements given by
Πx = (2pi∆
2)−1/2
∫ ∞
−∞
dye−
1
2 (x−y)2/∆2 |y〉〈y|. (6)
An ideal measurement of q (mod 2
√
pi) is described by the
PVM with elements P ′x =
∑∞
s=−∞ Px−2s√pi for x ∈
[0, 2
√
pi), and if we let Px → Πx we obtain the result for
a homodyne detector with a Gaussian acceptance. Without
loss of generality suppose we obtain a result correspond-
ing to Π0, then the state will be transformed to ψ0¯(q) ∝∑
s=Z exp(− 12q2κ2)ψ′sq(q+2s
√
pi), where ψ′sq is a squeezed
vacuum state in position with width ∆. If we obtain a result
other than Π0 we can simply apply a shift to correct the state.
This is of the same type of approximate codeword proposed
in the GKP paper [6]. Notice that our initial squeezing de-
termines the size of the overall envelope, width κ−1, while
the precision of our homodyne measurement determines the
width of the individual peaks.
If we further approximate by replacing exp(− 12q2κ2) →
exp(− 12 (2s
√
pi)2κ2) in the summation above, which corre-
sponds to scaling each peak by a constant factor, we find
|ψ0¯(q)|2 =
2κ
∆
√
pi
∞∑
s=−∞
e−4piκ
2s2e−(q−2s
√
pi)2/∆2 . (7)
We can correct for shifts in the position which are less than√
pi/2, and thus bound the error by adding up the contribution
from all of the tails further than
√
pi/2 from their respective
peak. Assuming that κ
√
pi  1 the probability of error is
bounded as Pe < 2∆2/(κpi) exp (− 14pi/∆2) [9].
The errors from incorrectly identifying an encoded state
will determine the amount by which one is able to violate the
CHSH inequality. Consider one term in the CHSH quantity S.
The correlator is defined as 〈aibj〉 = P (a = b|ij) − P (a 6=
b|ij) for outcomes a, b and measurement choices i, j. If we
assume that our gates are perfect then all errors will come
from incorrectly identifying an encoded state. We can cal-
culate the value of S after error correction by computing the
expectation values of the various measurements. This value
is plotted in Fig. 1, and it can be seen that we start to violate
the CHSH inequality for parameters ∆ = κ corresponding to
squeezing greater than 5 dB. This shows that the value of the
CHSH quantity is scaled according to the error rate, assuming
perfect gates.
The quantum bit error rate (QBER) [2] is defined as Q =
P (a 6= b|01) = 2Pe(1 − Pe) since we are only extracting
a key for the cases where Alice does measurement A0 and
Bob does measurement B1. This corresponds to either Alice
or Bob incorrectly identifying the state while the other party
does not make an error. The secret-key rate r, under collective
attacks, with one-way classical post-processing from Bob to
Alice, is lower bounded by the Devetak-Winter rate [4, 40]
r ≥ rDW = I(A0:B1)− χ(B1:E), (8)
where I(A0:B1) = 1 − h(Q) is the mutual information
between Alice and Bob (h being the binary entropy), and
χ(B1:E) is the Holevo quantity.
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FIG. 1: (color online) The extractable secret-key rate is plotted as
a function of the squeezing for the symmetric case ∆ = κ, where
∆ is the width of the individual peaks and κ−1 is the width of the
Gaussian envelope in the GKP encoding. Note that currently the
maximal amount of single-mode squeezing achieved is 12.7 dB [41,
42]. The shaded region indicates a violation of the CHSH inequality.
In Fig. 1, we plot both the QBER and the key rate r. No-
tice that the extractable key rate remains zero even for values
of S slightly larger than two. The key rate grows rapidly for
squeezing beyond 6 dB, for example, a squeezing of 10 dB
5yields a key rate of ≈ 98%. Note that the well known crit-
ical QBER of 11% for BB84 [43] as well as 7.1% for DV
device-independent QKD [4] are higher than the ≈ 3.5% crit-
ical QBER for this proposal. This is due to the fact that one
requires a suitable enough approximation to a GKP encoded
state in order to have a high enough violation of the CHSH
inequality, and by doing so one immediately achieves a cor-
responding low probability of error Pe. Typically one desires
a high critical QBER as it generally tolerates more imperfec-
tions in the protocol. However, in this case the difficulty arises
from the need to violate the CHSH inequality and if one is able
to do so then one already obtains a small QBER. Intuitively,
as the width of the individual peaks ∆ in the encoded state
become larger, and equivalently the QBER, the overall state
resembles a Gaussian state and thus cannot violate the CHSH
inequality.
VI. DISCUSSION OF LOSS, COMPARISON TO
DISCRETE-VARIABLES AND CONCLUSION
By harnessing the results of discrete-variable QKD, with a
qubit encoding in a harmonic oscillator, we provided the first
device-independent QKD protocol for continuous variables.
This protocol derived its security from the ability to violate a
Bell inequality and, remarkably, does not require Alice or Bob
to know the inner workings of their devices. We showed how
both the CHSH violation and the resulting extractable key-
rate depended on the quality of the approximate codewords.
We also showed that, in terms non-Gaussian resources, we re-
quired a modest one T -gate for each of∼ √N of N total Bell
pairs. Thankfully, from an experimental point of view, what
this means is that only Gaussian operations (e.g., homodyne
detection) are needed most of the time.
It should be noted that our encoding scheme is experimen-
tally challenging. However, it is still practical, with many pro-
posals already existing [24–28]. It is hoped that our paper
will further motivate experimental advances using such en-
codings. Given the technological challenges, distances in our
scheme will be limited (although not fundamentally). How-
ever, it should be noted that such limitations are also faced
by the discrete-variable version of device-independent QKD,
which is currently limited to a few kilometers. This is be-
cause it requires a detection efficiency of approximately 95%
to achieve a key rate on the order of 10−10 per pulse [44].
Interestingly, one can also consider the distances over
which our continuous-variable protocol will perform well. We
do this by calculating the Wigner function of an approximate
encoded state and then send it through an amplitude damp-
ing channel. We numerically find that, for example, at 2.3km,
with 0.2dB/km loss, we get a key rate of 0.35 bits/state. This
is comparable to discrete-variable device-independent QKD
where such schemes are limited to only a few kilometers [44].
Furthermore, we note that the distance of our protocol can
also be improved by using distillers as was shown for discrete-
variable states [45] or by the application of heralded ampli-
fiers [46].
It is an interesting open question whether one can devise
a device-independent continuous-variable QKD protocol with
more readily accessible states. One possible avenue to ex-
plore is lifting the requirement of a CHSH inequality violation
by considering a protocol where only one party trusts their de-
vice. This one-sided device-independent QKD requires one to
violate only an EPR-steering inequality [22], which amounts
to Alice and Bob checking that they have entanglement and
ruling out local hidden state models [47].
C.W. acknowledges support from NSERC. We are grateful
to Hoi-Kwong Lo and Norbert Lu¨tkenhaus for fruitful discus-
sions.
Appendix
Here we justify the use of several results in the paper. In
Sec. V we identified the approximate encoded state ψ0¯(q)
that would result when a finitely squeezed state ψsq(p) =
pi−1/4κ−1/2 exp
(− 12p2/κ2) was measured with a POVM
Eq. (6) subject to q mod 2
√
pi. Supposing that we find an
outcome corresponding to Π0 we have
|ψ0¯〉 ∝
∞∑
s=−∞
(2pi∆2)−1/2
∫ ∞
−∞
dye−
1
2 (2s
√
pi+q)2/∆2
× pi−1/4κ1/2e− 12 q2κ2δ(q − y),
∝
∞∑
s=−∞
e−
1
2 q
2κ2e−
1
2 (2s
√
pi+q)2/∆2 ,
∝
∞∑
s=−∞
e−
1
2 q
2κ2ψ′sq(q + 2s
√
pi). (A.1)
Thus we recover the fact that this measurement projects the
state onto a superposition of squeezed states in qˆ with a spac-
ing of 2
√
pi and width of ∆ weighted by an overall Gaussian
envelope of width κ−1.
In Sec. V we stated that the value of S, with error correc-
tion, can be calculated by finding the appropriate expectation
values. Consider the box function
Π(x) =
{
1 if |x| ≤ 1/2
0 if |x| > 1/2 . (A.2)
To calculate the value of Tr(|m〉〈n|Z), with m,n ∈ {0, 1},
for an element of the density matrix, we simply perform the
integral ∫ ∞
−∞
ψm(q)Z(q)ψn(q)dq, (A.3)
where Z(q) = 2
{∑
s∈Z Π[(q − 2s
√
pi)/
√
pi]− 1/2}. Cal-
culating a trace involving X is similar to q being replaced by
p and using the corresponding Fourier transforms of the wave-
functions, while the other two necessary measurements
α =
( −i cos pi8 −i sin pi8−i sin pi8 i cos pi8
)
, (A.4)
β =
( −i cos pi8 −i sin pi8
i sin pi8 −i cos pi8
)
, (A.5)
6can be decomposed into a sum of Z,X and calculated using
the linearity of the trace function.
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